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ABSTRACT 
  The American rule dictates that regardless of the outcome, parties 
pay for their own attorneys’ fees unless Congress has specifically 
enacted a fee-shifting statute authorizing courts to award fees to 
prevailing parties. One of the most recognized fee-shifting statutes is 
42 U.S.C. § 1988. Courts and scholars have extensively discussed 
whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party under § 1988. Yet both have 
largely ignored one scenario in which a plaintiff files a suit containing 
both constitutional claims for which fees are authorized under § 1988 
(fee claims) and state law claims for which fees are not authorized 
(nonfee claims). Courts then, invoking the avoidance doctrine, simply 
rule on the state law claim and leave the constitutional claim 
unaddressed. In this scenario, is the plaintiff a prevailing party under 
§ 1988? The few courts that have addressed this question have 
adopted a rule that unnecessarily favors plaintiffs at the expense of 
defendants by allowing courts to award fees without finding that the 
defendants violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. It also creates a 
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system that is ripe for abuse—one in which plaintiffs can use pleading 
tricks to obtain fee awards with “mere incantations” of fee claims. 
This Note proposes revising this rule by requiring that the fee and 
nonfee claims be reasonably related, with a heavy emphasis on 
whether they are based on related legal theories. This new rule would 
still let courts invoke the avoidance doctrine but would better protect 
defendants without unnecessarily burdening plaintiffs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other civil rights statutes 
to give private citizens and businesses the power to sue the 
government when it violates their constitutional or federal statutory 
rights. Recognizing that many victims of constitutional violations 
cannot afford to bring civil suits, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 
which gives courts the power to make defendants pay the attorneys’ 
fees of plaintiffs that prevail on certain civil rights claims, called fee 
claims. But § 1988 fails to address a critical procedural issue: what 
happens when plaintiffs bring both fee claims and nonfee claims 
(those based on laws not covered by § 1988, such as state statutes) 
and win only on those other (nonfee) grounds? Should defendants 
have to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees anyway? 
In 2007, the Fourth Circuit confronted just this problem. In 
Giovanni Carandola, Ltd. v. City of Greensboro,1 the City of 
Greensboro passed an ordinance limiting where “sexually oriented 
businesses” could locate in the city.2 Giovanni Carandola, Ltd. 
(Carandola), along with five other adult businesses, filed a § 1983 suit 
alleging the city violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.3 
Carandola additionally included a nonfee claim that it was not subject 
to the ordinance as written.4 Carandola moved for summary judgment 
based only on the nonfee claim.5 The court granted summary 
judgment for Carandola on the nonfee claim but did not rule on the 
fee claim.6 
 
 1. Giovanni Carandola, Ltd. v. City of Greensboro, 258 F. App’x 512 (4th Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam). 
 2. Id. at 514. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.; Plaintiff-Appellants’ Supplemental Brief in Case Number 07-1249, at 9, Carandola, 
258 F. App’x 512 (Nos. 06-2181 & 07-1249), 2007 WL 1974220. 
 6. Carandola, 258 F. App’x at 514, 516. 
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Had Carandola won the § 1983 claim, the court could have 
required Greensboro to pay Carandola’s attorney’s fees under § 1988. 
Absent any § 1983 claim, however, the American rule—the 
traditional rule of attorney compensation—would have required 
Carandola to pay its own fees. The Fourth Circuit ultimately and 
correctly decided that the fee claims and the nonfee claims were too 
unrelated to justify holding that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties.7 
But its reasoning was unclear,8 and other courts have reached the 
opposite result.9 
The problem the Fourth Circuit faced was how to reconcile two 
competing policy goals: encouraging civil rights suits and protecting 
defendants from paying attorneys’ fees for meritless claims. Congress 
enacted § 1988 to encourage plaintiffs to bring suits to vindicate their 
civil rights.10 But the text of § 1988 assumes that courts reached 
decisions on the merits of fee claims. In practice, however, the rule of 
avoidance occasionally hinders plaintiffs. This rule asks courts to 
avoid deciding constitutional claims when they can reach a decision 
on other grounds.11 So in situations like Carandola, in which courts do 
not address fee claims,12 courts often fail to decide fee claims that may 
have merit. If plaintiffs never receive attorneys’ fees in Carandola-
like situations, then courts undermine the purpose of  
§ 1988. But § 1988 makes losing defendants pay more than in ordinary 
litigation under the American rule. As a result, forcing defendants to 
pay attorneys’ fees in Carandola-like situations for potentially 
meritless fee claims seems unfair. Indeed, it could encourage plaintiffs 
to tack on a meritless fee claim—to bring it as a “mere 
incantation”13—just to recover attorneys’ fees. 
To avoid this unfairness and potential abuse, courts that have 
faced this issue agree that some relationship must exist between the 
 
 7. Id. at 514. 
 8. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. Carandola, 258 F. App’x at 517–18 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7 (1976)). For 
more on the avoidance doctrine, see infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 12. In fact, the Carandola court did not invoke the avoidance doctrine. The plaintiffs 
simply had not put the fee claim before the court on summary judgment. Carandola, 258 F. 
App’x at 518. For the purposes of this Note, however, Carandola is portrayed as a typical 
situation in which courts struggle with Gagne and Smith. 
 13. Smith v. Cumberland Sch. Comm., 703 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1983), aff’d sub nom. Smith v. 
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
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fee claim and the other, nonfee claim on which the plaintiff prevails.14 
But courts cannot agree how related those claims must be.15 The 
Supreme Court has addressed this issue twice, first in Maher v. 
Gagne16 and then again in Smith v. Robinson.17 In Gagne, the Court 
cursorily established a two-prong rule—what this Note calls the 
Gagne rule—that allows fees (1) if the fee claim is “substantial” and 
(2) if the fee claim and nonfee claim arise from a “common nucleus of 
operative fact.”18 Recognizing that Gagne’s two-prong test allowed 
attorneys’ fees too easily, the Smith Court clarified that fee claims 
must be “reasonably related to the plaintiff’s ultimate success.”19 But 
the Court did not explain how courts should incorporate Smith into 
the existing Gagne rule. 
As a result, lower courts have struggled to apply Gagne and 
Smith in Carandola-like situations.20 Their confusion, in turn, has 
undermined the purpose of § 1988—without a fairly balanced test, 
either undeserving plaintiffs can obtain attorneys’ fees at the 
defendants’ expense or victims of constitutional violations are 
discouraged from suing. Interestingly, scholars have largely ignored 
this confusion among the courts. Although scholars have debated 
other aspects of fee-shifting statutes, they have not seriously discussed 
the relationship between Gagne and Smith. The handful of articles 
that do address the two-prong Gagne rule and the later Smith 
modifications merely mention that Smith restricted the two-prong 
Gagne rule, but they neither point out that courts have failed to 
incorporate these restrictions nor propose any method for properly 
recognizing the impact of Smith.21 
This Note, then, provides the first analysis of the proper 
circumstances for courts to award attorneys’ fees under § 1988 in 
Carandola-like situations. After considering several possible 
approaches, it argues that courts should make the Smith rule the third 
prong of the Gagne test. Before awarding fees in situations similar to 
the Carandola case, courts should find that (1) the fee claim is 
 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980). 
 17. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
 18. Gagne, 448 U.S. at 132 & n.15. 
 19. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1007. 
 20. See infra Part II.B. 
 21. E.g., Erika Geetter, Comment, Attorney’s Fees for § 1983 Claims in Fair Hearings: 
Rethinking Current Jurisprudence, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1267, 1277–78 (1988). 
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substantial; (2) the fee claim and nonfee claim arise from a common 
nucleus of operative fact; and (3) the fee claim is reasonably related 
to the plaintiff’s ultimate success, focusing primarily on whether the 
fee and nonfee claims present related legal theories. This solution 
best resolves the competing policy concerns that § 1988 attempts to 
balance. 
Part I of this Note gives the legislative history of § 1988 and 
explains the policy concerns that underpin it. Part II presents courts’ 
responses to the problem this Note addresses. It explores the Court’s 
reasoning in the Gagne decision and explains why it modified the 
Gagne standard in Smith. It then shows the variety of approaches 
lower courts have taken to apply Gagne and Smith. Part III considers 
the benefits and drawbacks of their approaches and sets out the 
proposed three-prong test. 
I.  THE HISTORY AND COMPETING POLICY PURPOSES OF § 1988 
Under the American rule, litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees 
regardless of who wins, unless a statute or an enforceable contract 
provision authorizes fee shifting.22 In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. 
Wilderness Society,23 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of 
the American rule and held that only Congress could shift fees and 
only through “specific and explicit [statutory authorizations] for the 
allowance of attorneys’ fees.”24 Congress quickly exercised that power 
and passed the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976  
(§ 1988).25 When it enacted § 1988, Congress primarily focused on 
encouraging plaintiffs to go to court to vindicate their civil rights.26 
Congress understood that it needed private enforcement by citizens 
 
 22. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 257 (1975). For an 
excellent history on the American rule, see generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the 
American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (Winter 1984). 
 23. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
 24. Id. at 260. 
 25. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000)). 
 26. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. S16251 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (statement of Sen. Scott), 
reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., CIVIL RIGHTS 
ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976 (PUBLIC LAW 94559, S. 2278): SOURCE BOOK: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 19 (Comm. Print 1976) (“[S]piraling 
court costs have created an absolute necessity of attorney’s fee provisions [in civil rights 
statutes] . . . [t]o encourage citizens to go to court in private suits to vindicate its policies and 
protect their rights.”). 
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to ensure “effective enforcement of [f]ederal civil rights statutes.”27 
Often, though, private citizens do not have the resources to go to 
court, so Congress created fee-shifting statutes to encourage litigants 
to bring the cases.28 Section 1988 enticed lawyers to take civil rights 
cases with indigent clients because they were more likely to be 
compensated for their time if they prevailed.29 
The text of § 1988(b) states that “[i]n any action or proceeding to 
enforce a provision of [various civil rights statutes], the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”30 In many 
cases in which plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees, the court has already 
reached a decision on the merits of the underlying fee claim. The 
rules in this situation are well-defined; plaintiffs who win on fee 
claims can seek attorneys’ fees, and plaintiffs who lose cannot.31 But 
when the court has not reached the merits of the fee claim but decides 
the nonfee claim, the outcome is less clear. Courts sometimes avoid 
deciding fee claims because of a “longstanding judicial policy of 
avoiding unnecessary decision of important constitutional issues,”32 
commonly referred to as the avoidance doctrine.33 Thus courts must 
decide whether to award fees without ever having reached the 
constitutional issue that fee shifting is designed to help. 
In deciding whether plaintiffs may seek attorneys’ fees under  
§ 1988 in these Carandola-like situations, courts must decide between 
two competing policy interests: encouraging civil rights suits and 
protecting defendants from paying attorneys’ fees for meritless 
claims. On the one hand, preventing plaintiffs from seeking attorneys’ 
fees in all Carandola-like situations seems to unduly punish plaintiffs 
for courts’ decisions to rely on the avoidance doctrine. Plaintiffs could 
bring entirely meritorious fee claims but also choose to include 
 
 27. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 209. 
 28. E.g., id. at 2–3, 9, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., 
supra note 26, at 210–11, 217. 
 29. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989) (allowing a prevailing attorney 
to recover more than the fixed amount of the contingency fee the plaintiff had agreed to pay); 
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894–95 (1984) (allowing pro bono attorneys to recover fees 
under § 1988 after their clients prevailed). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
 31. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 32. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 133 (1980) (quoting Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 342 
(2d Cir. 1979)). 
 33. See, e.g., Carandola, 258 F. App’x at 518 (referring to the doctrine in this manner).  
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nonfee claims. In such cases, courts, acting on their own initiative, 
may invoke the avoidance doctrine and refuse to even consider the 
fee claims. Plaintiffs are then forced to either exclude perfectly valid 
nonfee claims from their complaints or else risk losing the 
opportunity to seek attorneys’ fees for reasons entirely unrelated to 
the merit of their claims. 
On the other hand, in a Carandola-like situation the court has 
not ruled that the defendant violated any constitutional rights, so 
imposing attorneys’ fees punishes defendants without any finding of 
wrongdoing. The text of § 1988, consistent with legislative intent,34 
states that courts may award fees when defendants have actually 
violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.35 Following this 
interpretation, courts have unanimously held that plaintiffs are not 
entitled to fees when they lose on their fee claims.36 Moreover, 
allowing fees in all Carandola-like cases creates a loophole in the 
system and encourages plaintiffs to abuse § 1988. A clever plaintiff—
or, more realistically, a clever plaintiff’s counsel—who intendeds to 
bring a state law claim could simply tack on a constitutional claim, 
even one that is almost certainly meritless.37 The court would 
presumably invoke the avoidance doctrine and decide the case on the 
dispositive nonfee grounds, giving the plaintiff a windfall of attorney’s 
fees. The Supreme Court itself has recognized this potential for 
abuse: “If a litigant could obtain fees simply by an incantation of  
§ 1983, fees would become available in almost every case.”38 
Accordingly, the Court has cautioned that “plaintiffs may not rely 
 
 34. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 8 (noting that the legislation was needed so that “those 
who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity”); H.R. REP. NO. 
94-1558, at 1, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, 
at 209 (stating that the purpose of the legislation is to give plaintiffs access to courts when “laws 
are violated”). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). 
 36. See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 1982) (“We find no 
legislative intent to treat a losing party in a § 1983 action as a ‘prevailing party’ simply because 
he prevails on a related state claim.”). 
 37. Although this Note does not address the ethics of such tactics, it acknowledges that 
jurisdictions’ rules of professional conduct may bar some abuses of § 1988. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. 
P. 11(b) (“By presenting to the court a pleading . . . an attorney . . . certifies that: . . . (1) it is not 
being presented for any improper purpose; [and] (2) [all] claims . . . are warranted by existing 
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending the law . . . .”). 
 38. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1003 (1984). 
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simply on the fact that substantial fee-generating claims were made 
during the course of litigation.”39 
The legitimate need to avoid penalizing a plaintiff for a court’s 
understandable reluctance to resolve constitutional questions when 
other grounds are dispositive should not “alter the requirement that a 
claim for which fees are awarded be reasonably related to the 
plaintiff’s ultimate success.”40 Even in cases like Carandola, which 
lacked any intimation that the plaintiffs had brought their 
constitutional claims as a pleading trick to obtain fees, fidelity to the 
American rule and basic notions of fairness dictate that courts should 
not award fees unless they have some indication that the defendants 
have engaged in conduct for which Congress has specifically 
authorized an award of fees. As Part II discusses, though the Court 
has acknowledged the need to address these concerns, the rules 
adopted by the lower courts fail to properly incorporate the Court’s 
guidance. 
II.  PERPETUATING THE IMBALANCE: THE GAGNE RULE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS’ SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT 
A. Supreme Court Treatment 
1. The Undesirable Rule: Maher v. Gagne.  In § 1988’s legislative 
history, Congress took the position that plaintiffs’ rights should trump 
in Carandola-like situations. Although the text of § 1988 and the 
Senate report did not mention this scenario, the House report 
addressed it in a footnote and recommends awarding attorneys’ fees.41 
In that footnote, the House report identified two criteria for 
determining when plaintiffs can recover attorneys’ fees. First, the fee 
claim must be substantial.42 Second, both the fee claim and the nonfee 
claim must arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact.43 
In dicta in a footnote in Maher v. Gagne, the Court endorsed the 
House report’s proposed two-prong test without any modification.44 
 
 39. Id. at 1007. 
 40. Id. 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7 (1976), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 212. The Senate report for § 1988 includes no 
corresponding passage. 
 42. Id. (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974)). 
 43. Id. (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). 
 44. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132 & n.15 (1980). 
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The Court thus agreed that, for plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees 
after prevailing on grounds other than fee claims, (1) the fee claim 
must be substantial and (2) both the fee claim and the nonfee claim 
must arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact.45  
This two-prong Gagne rule has substantial breadth. In essence, 
the rule allows a party to seek fees if it prevails on any properly 
joined nonfee claim so long as the fee claim remained undecided in 
the case and was not frivolous.46 The first prong of the Gagne rule 
requires merely that the fee claim be substantial, which is simply the 
federal-question test for federal jurisdiction.47 A fee claim is 
substantial so long as it is not “essentially fictitious,” “wholly 
insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” or “obviously without merit.”48 
As one court put it, 
[C]laims are constitutionally insubstantial only if the prior decisions 
inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous decisions that 
merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not 
render them insubstantial . . . . A claim is insubstantial only if “its 
unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this 
court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference 
that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of 
controversy.”49 
The first prong requires no additional inquiry into whether the 
constitutional claim would have been likely to succeed.50 
 
 45. Id. at 132 n.15 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7). 
 46. E.g., Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Twp. of Clay, 791 F.2d 447, 451–52 (6th Cir. 1986). In 
Seaway Drive-In, Inc., the court explained that 
[t]he test quoted from the legislative history [of § 1988] for determining when fees 
may be awarded based on an unaddressed fee claim—i.e., the requirements that the 
fee claim be substantial and that the fee and nonfee claims arise out of a common 
nucleus of operative fact—is identical to [the test] that a district court must apply 
when determining whether the court has pendent jurisdiction over state law 
claims. . . . In other words, to hold that the constitutional claims in this case were not 
substantial is to hold that the District Court did not have jurisdiction over the state 
law claims. 
Id. 
 47. E.g., Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 551 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 48. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974). The legislative history cited Hagans, along 
with United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), for guidance when defining 
“substantial.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 212. 
 49. Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 581 (D.R.I. 1982) (quoting Hagans, 415 U.S. at 537–
38). 
 50. See Hagans, 415 U.S. at 538 (explaining that “claims of doubtful or questionable merit” 
can still be substantial). 
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The second prong requires only that the fee and nonfee claims 
arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact; the claims do not 
need any other similarities. The fee and nonfee claims share a 
common nucleus of operative fact if the nonfee claim was properly 
joined in the case under the federal court’s supplemental 
jurisdiction.51 Courts do not have to inquire into the degree of factual 
or legal relatedness between the fee and nonfee claims.52 The Gagne 
rule’s expansive nature thus infringes defendants’ rights by too 
readily awarding attorneys’ fees and encourages using pleading tricks 
to circumvent the American rule. In fact, the Court later seemed to 
regret its hasty and unquestioning acceptance of the House report’s 
rule. Four years after Gagne, the Court addressed the merits of the 
Gagne rule in Smith v. Robinson. 
2. Subsequent Consideration: Smith v. Robinson.  Although the 
procedural history of Smith is complicated,53 in essence the plaintiffs 
had alleged fee claims, which courts had not addressed,54 and nonfee 
claims, on which the plaintiffs had prevailed55—a Carandola-like 
situation. The Court began by reaffirming the general two-prong 
Gagne rule.56 Yet this time, the Court recognized the Gagne rule’s 
overly broad reach and potential for abuse. It acknowledged that the 
two-prong Gagne rule allowed a court to award fees any time a 
plaintiff prevailed on a nonfee claim that was properly joined in a 
case under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction. Such a test, the 
Court reasoned, invited abuse: “If a litigant could obtain fees simply 
by an incantation of § 1983, fees would become available in almost 
every case.”57 The Court wanted more than just the presence of an 
unaddressed fee claim in the case;58 it wanted some assurance that the 
 
 51. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. Gibbs is the case cited in the legislative history as a guide for 
when claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7, 
reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 212. 
 52. See, e.g., Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 346 F.3d at 551. 
 53. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 995 (1984). 
 54. Id. at 1007. 
 55. Id. at 1002 (concluding that the plaintiffs had prevailed on claims based on the 
Education of the Handicapped Act, which does not authorize an award of fees). 
 56. See id. (“[W]hen the claim upon which a plaintiff actually prevails is accompanied by a 
‘substantial,’ though undecided, § 1983 claim arising from the same nucleus of facts, a fee award 
is appropriate.” (citing Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 130–31 (1980))). 
 57. Id. at 1003. 
 58. See id. at 1007 (“The fact that constitutional claims are made does not render automatic 
an award of fees for the entire proceeding.”). 
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relationship between the fee and nonfee claims was close enough to 
still uphold the purpose of § 1988—protecting plaintiffs’ civil rights.59 
To allay these concerns, the Court held that, in addition to 
meeting the two prongs of the Gagne rule, the fee and nonfee claims 
must be “reasonably related.”60 Defining when claims are reasonably 
related, the Court stated that when the case contains fee and nonfee 
claims asking for “different relief” based on (1) “different legal facts” 
and (2) different “legal theories,” the court may not award fees simply 
because the plaintiff prevails on the nonfee claim.61 Gagne arguably 
already prohibited—under its common nucleus of operative fact 
prong—fee awards when the facts of the fee and nonfee claims are 
totally unrelated. But as this Note explains in Parts II.B.2 and III.B, 
the Smith opinion significantly restricts Gagne by adding a 
requirement that the fee and nonfee claims share reasonably related 
legal theories. 
B. The Circuit Courts’ Failure to Recognize and Integrate Smith 
Despite the Court’s effort to narrow the Gagne rule and 
articulate a workable standard, courts have struggled to interpret 
Smith. Often the end result is that they continue to apply the original 
two-prong Gagne rule without properly incorporating Smith’s 
restrictions (if they mention Smith at all). Since Smith, seven circuit 
courts have addressed the Gagne rule. Four courts have failed to read 
Smith as imposing any changes on the two-prong Gagne rule. Three 
courts have found that Smith does alter the Gagne rule but have not 
properly interpreted Smith’s effect to adequately protect defendants 
and limit the potential for abuse. This Section’s analysis of the circuit 
courts’ failure to adequately integrate Smith sets the stage for Part III, 
which advocates adding Smith’s “reasonably related” language to the 
Gagne test as a third factor, with a particular emphasis on whether the 
fee and nonfee claims present reasonably related legal theories. 
1. Failure to Recognize Smith.  The Fifth, Tenth, and Ninth 
Circuits have failed to read Smith as imposing any restrictions on the 
two-prong Gagne rule. Two of these circuits did not recognize Smith 
at all. The Fifth Circuit did not even mention Smith when discussing 
whether to award fees. Instead it merely approved the original Gagne 
 
 59. See supra notes 26–29, 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 60. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1007. 
 61. Id. at 1015 (emphasis added).  
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rule, holding that proper findings that courts have supplemental 
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ nonfee claims make plaintiffs eligible for 
fee awards.62 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit failed to impose any 
requirement that fee and nonfee claims be reasonably related, leaving 
defendants vulnerable to paying fees even without any indication that 
they violated plaintiffs’ civil rights. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit 
apparently did not recognize that Smith modifies the Gagne rule. It 
framed the rule using only the original two prongs and then briefly 
mentioned approvingly that the plaintiff sought the same relief for 
both the fee and nonfee claims.63 Again, the court did not mention 
that the fee and nonfee claims, particularly the legal theories behind 
each claim, should be reasonably related. 
The Ninth Circuit did acknowledge Smith as having some effect, 
but not on the breadth of the Gagne rule. Instead it read Smith as 
standing for the proposition that courts should interpret § 1988 
broadly.64 The court merely approved the original two-prong Gagne 
rule without requiring fee and nonfee claims to be reasonably 
related.65 
2. Failure to Properly Incorporate Smith.  Only four circuits have 
tried to restrict the Gagne rule after Smith, but they ultimately have 
failed to meaningfully limit the Gagne standard. Two of these 
circuits—the Sixth and the Eleventh—attempted to directly 
incorporate Smith’s “reasonably related” language, but they did not 
give it any real weight. The Sixth Circuit interpreted Smith as 
requiring plaintiffs seeking attorneys’ fees to present fee and nonfee 
claims involving related facts or related legal theories.66 Thus, even if 
two claims rely on drastically different legal theories, they satisfy the 
Sixth Circuit’s watered-down reading of Smith so long as they are 
based on the same facts because all cases arising out of a common 
nucleus of operative fact share some facts. According to the Sixth 
Circuit, any situation that meets the Gagne rule also meets the Smith 
rule. Smith therefore imposes no actual limits on Gagne under the 
Sixth Circuit’s approach. Yet the concerns expressed in Smith about 
Gagne indicate that Smith was supposed to impose a limit. 
 
 62. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 551 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 63. Plott v. Griffiths, 938 F.2d 164, 167–68 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 64. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Garamendi, 400 F.3d 803, 810 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 65. Id. at 808–09. 
 66. Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Twp. of Clay, 791 F.2d 447, 455 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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The Eleventh Circuit took a similarly flawed approach. Unlike 
earlier courts that continued Gagne’s two-prong approach, the court 
properly67 read Smith as creating a new third prong—that the fee and 
nonfee claims be reasonably related—in addition to the substantiality 
and common nucleus of operative fact requirements of the two-prong 
Gagne rule.68 But the court then defined “reasonably related” as 
“aimed at achieving the same result based on the same facts or legal 
theories . . . . [so that] if the fee and nonfee claims merely present 
alternate theories of recovery for the same injury, they are reasonably 
related.”69 Its approach thus suffers from the same defect as the Sixth 
Circuit’s—it allows an award of fees if the fee and nonfee claims are 
merely factually related. 
The Seventh Circuit focused on the second prong of the Gagne 
rule—the degree of factual relatedness required between the fee and 
nonfee claims. Indirectly recognizing Smith’s impact, it modified 
Gagne’s second prong—the common nucleus of operative fact 
standard—requiring instead that the fee and nonfee claims be 
“closely related factually.”70 To define “closely related factually,” the 
Seventh Circuit adopted a standard from another Seventh Circuit 
case,71 Lenard v. Argento.72 Lenard required courts to find a higher 
factual similarity between fee and nonfee claims before awarding fees 
than they must find when establishing supplemental jurisdiction73—
that is, the Lenard court demanded a higher degree of factual 
similarity between fee and nonfee claims than does the second prong 
of the Gagne rule. 
The Fourth Circuit, in Carandola, came closest to meaningfully 
restricting the Gagne rule’s reach. Unlike other circuits, the Fourth 
Circuit apparently did not read the substantiality and common 
nucleus of operative fact requirements as equivalent to the 
supplemental jurisdiction test. According to the Fourth Circuit, after 
 
 67. See infra Part III.C. 
 68. Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1527–28 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Thus, in 
order to receive attorney’s fees when only nonfee claims are addressed, a plaintiff must show 
that it (1) has prevailed and that the section 1983 claim (2) meets the substantiality test, (3) 
arises from a common nucleus of operative fact with the nonfee claims, and (4) is reasonably 
related to the plaintiff’s ultimate success.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. Wis. Hosp. Ass’n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 73. Id. at 1245–46. 
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Smith, “the non-fee claim must have been reasonably related to the 
fee claim.”74 Accordingly, the court defined “reasonably related” 
claims as ones raising “tightly intertwined” legal issues.75 Although 
the Carandola court could have used this new language to 
substantively restrict Gagne, it instead claimed that its opinion was in 
line with the Tenth Circuit’s and Sixth Circuit’s decisions. It simply 
ruled against the plaintiffs and distinguished Carandola from those 
cases because, in Carandola, the district court had not invoked the 
avoidance doctrine.76 
These circuits’ approaches prove problematic because they all 
allow an award of fees merely because the fee and nonfee claims are 
factually related. As Part III.B shows, factual similarity offers no 
assurance that the defendant actually violated the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights. Returning to the Carandola case, if courts 
imposed only a heightened factual relatedness standard, Carandola 
and the other plaintiffs could recover fees because they raised 
factually related claims. Both the plaintiffs’ nonfee and fee claims 
stemmed from the ordinance’s enactment and the existence of the 
sexually oriented businesses. Yet there was no indication in 
Carandola that the City of Greensboro had actually violated the 
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. A heightened factual similarity requirement simply 
does not address the Smith Court’s policy concerns. As Part III.C 
argues, to properly incorporate Smith into Gagne, courts must find 
that fee and nonfee claims are based on related legal theories in 
addition to their factual similarity. 
III.  ALTERNATIVES FOR HEIGHTENING THE STANDARDS UNDER 
THE GAGNE RULE: ADDING A THIRD PRONG AND REQUIRING 
RELATED LEGAL THEORIES 
Courts should give true force to Smith’s restrictions on Gagne. 
But to do so, they require a rule synthesizing the two cases that 
refrains from “penalizing a litigant for the fact that courts are 
properly reluctant to resolve constitutional questions if a 
nonconstitutional claim is dispositive.”77 At the same time, this new 
 
 74. Giovanni Carandola, Ltd. v. City of Greensboro, 258 F. App’x 512, 517 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(per curiam). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 517 n.2. 
 77. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1007. 
BRUMLEY IN FINAL3.DOC 11/24/2008  6:01:24 PM 
2009] AVOIDING MERE INCANTATIONS 701 
rule must protect defendants from fee awards when plaintiffs merely 
invoke a fee claim or when courts lack assurance that there is a 
reasonable probability defendants have actually violated plaintiffs’ 
civil rights. 
As discussed in Part II.B, courts that have considered Smith have 
disagreed about how to incorporate that opinion into the Gagne rule. 
Those courts have primarily taken one of three approaches. First, 
some courts have strengthened the first prong of the Gagne rule and 
required plaintiffs to show a greater likelihood of success on the 
merits of the fee claim.78 Second, some courts have stiffened the 
second prong of the Gagne rule and incorporated Smith’s reasonably 
related requirement into the common nucleus of operative fact 
inquiry.79 This approach requires a higher degree of factual similarity 
than the original Gagne rule required. Finally, some courts have 
viewed Smith’s reasonably related requirement as a separate and new 
prong of the Gagne rule80—creating a three-prong Gagne rule.  
This Part argues that courts should reject the first approach 
because it leads to results that completely defeat the purpose of the 
Gagne rule and the avoidance doctrine. Although the second and 
third tests are both feasible, the third alternative—setting “reasonably 
related” as a separate and new requirement of the Gagne rule—is 
most likely to provide clear guidance to courts so that they can 
properly fulfill the purpose behind § 1988 while protecting defendants 
from paying plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees when Congress did not intend 
defendants to do so. 
A. First Alternative: A Heightened Substantiality Requirement 
The two-prong Gagne rule’s requirement that the fee claim be 
substantial merely requires that it not be so devoid of merit that it 
 
 78. The Sixth Circuit criticized the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan for taking a similar approach. See Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Twp. of Clay, 791 F.2d 447, 
452 (6th Cir. 1986) (“The District Court applied a more stringent ‘substantiality’ test than this 
and improperly denied the fee request.”). 
 79. The Middle District of North Carolina arguably took this approach. See Giovanni 
Carandola, Ltd. v. City of Greensboro, No. 1:05CV1166, 2007 WL 703333, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 
1, 2007) (mem.) (“The types of cases involving a [sic] similar pendant [sic] and § 1983 claims that 
are appropriately deemed to share a common nucleus of facts are generally those in which a 
plaintiff presents a number of related issues to the court, and the court reaches a decision on 
one claim while abstaining from ruling on the constitutional one.”), aff’d, 258 F. App’x 512 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (per curiam).  
 80. The Eleventh Circuit took this approach. Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 
1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1988). 
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does not warrant judicial consideration.81 A heightened substantiality 
requirement for the fee claim could help ensure that courts will 
restrict the scope of the two-prong Gagne rule to situations that are 
more likely to involve actual civil rights violations. Stringently 
interpreted, this alternative would require courts to decide the merits 
of constitutional claims if the party prevails on the nonfee claim. 
Section 1988’s legislative history suggested this is the correct 
approach when the unaddressed fee claim does not have 
constitutional implications.82 This alternative, however, is 
inappropriate when dealing with unaddressed constitutional claims 
because it completely disregards judicial hesitancy to unnecessarily 
decide constitutional questions in the first place. 
Alternatively, courts could require that fee claims meet a more 
minimal viability standard by finding parties eligible for fees if fee 
claims could survive motions to dismiss or summary judgment 
motions. Although this standard would be less offensive to the 
avoidance doctrine because courts would make no final decision on 
the merits of the constitutional claims, it would not sufficiently restrict 
the scope of the two-prong Gagne rule, and it would still require 
courts to make some determination on the merits of the constitutional 
claims. These requirements would restrict Gagne’s inquiry into 
whether the fee claims were substantial, but they would do little to 
ensure that the claims would likely succeed on the merits. For 
example, a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss even though 
“actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘ . . . a recovery is very 
remote and unlikely.’”83 Similarly, even if a plaintiff prevailed against 
a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff’s claims are not necessarily 
meritorious. The Supreme Court has even stated, in a related context, 
that demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits 
may not provide sufficient assurance that the defendant violated a 
plaintiff’s civil rights to justify an award of fees under § 1988.84 
 
 81. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 82. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7 (1976), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS, 94TH CONG., supra note 26, at 212 (“To the extent a plaintiff joins a claim under one of 
the statutes enumerated in [§ 1988] with a claim that does not allow attorney fees, that plaintiff, 
if it prevails on the nonfee claim, is entitled to a determination on the other claim for the 
purpose of awarding counsel fees.” (citing Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 
1973))). 
 83. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 
 84. In a case considering 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff had obtained a temporary 
injunction by demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Wyner v. Struhs, 
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Although the Court was speaking in a context outside of the Gagne 
rule,85 its sentiments are telling: they indicate that even heightened 
viability standards do not ensure that the claims ultimately would 
have prevailed. Requiring fee claims to survive a motion to dismiss or 
summary judgment standard would not sufficiently restrict the Gagne 
rule because those standards provide no real assurance that the 
defendant violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. 
Regardless of the degree of viability courts required, imposing a 
heightened substantiality standard under the Gagne rule would be 
undesirable. Courts applying such a standard would likely need to 
conduct a highly fact-bound inquiry into the merits of the fee claims. 
Courts would struggle to administer this standard because it would 
spawn a second round of litigation,86 which the Court has repeatedly 
stressed courts should avoid.87 This second round of litigation would 
force courts to decide constitutional issues despite their 
understandable hesitancy to do so, or else it would fail to 
meaningfully restrict the scope of the Gagne rule by allowing courts 
to award attorneys’ fees without any indication that the defendant 
violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. 
B. Second Alternative: Heightened Common Nucleus of Operative 
Fact Requirement 
Alternatively, courts could restrict the Gagne doctrine by 
requiring a heightened factual similarity between fee and nonfee 
claims. Under the two-prong Gagne rule, “common nucleus of 
operative fact” merely means that “if[] considered without regard to 
their federal or state character, a plaintiff’s claims are such that he 
would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial 
 
254 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1300, 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Sole v. Wyner, 127 S. Ct. 2188 
(2007). The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not eligible for an award of fees under  
§ 1988 after failing to obtain a permanent injunction. Sole, 127 S. Ct. at 2191. 
 85. See Sole, 127 S. Ct. at 2191 (“This Court expresses no view on whether, in the absence 
of a final decision on the merits of a claim for permanent injunctive relief, success in gaining a 
preliminary injunction may sometimes warrant an award of counsel fees.”). 
 86. The Court employed similar reasoning when rejecting the catalyst theory as a ground 
for awarding fees under § 1988. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609–10 (2001) (“[A] ‘catalyst theory’ hearing 
would . . . ‘likely depend on a highly factbound inquiry’ and . . . . is clearly not a formula for 
‘ready administrability.’” (citations omitted)). 
 87. E.g., id. at 609; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 
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proceeding.”88 After Smith, some courts arguably have already read 
“common nucleus of operative fact” to impose a heightened 
requirement for factual similarity between fee and nonfee claims 
beyond Gagne’s test for supplemental jurisdiction.89 
Logically, a heightened common nucleus of operative fact 
standard would require factual similarity between fee and nonfee 
claims. Under this standard, courts would find that claims are related 
if they grew out of the same incident. For example, if a plaintiff who 
had been beaten by the police filed a claim for excessive force and an 
equal protection claim—arguing that the police beating was racially 
motivated—then the claims would be sufficiently factually related 
because both grew out of the beating.90 This restriction would limit 
the scope of the Gagne rule by requiring a more rigorous analysis of 
the factual connection between the fee and nonfee claims than Gagne 
requires. This factual-similarity requirement would potentially limit 
the pleading tricks91 available to plaintiffs. Moreover, it would not 
offend the avoidance doctrine because courts could evaluate claims’ 
factual similarity without deciding the merits of the constitutional fee 
claim. 
Although strengthening the common nucleus of operative fact 
test could restrict the Gagne rule, it fails to properly offer some 
indication that defendants actually violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. 
Courts could award fees as long as fee and nonfee claims were 
factually related, even if the claims were not based on similar legal 
theories.92 Theoretically, courts could interpret the heightened 
common nucleus of operative fact inquiry to encompass both factual 
 
 88. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), cited with approval in H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1558, at 4 n.7 (1976), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 94TH 
CONG., supra note 26, at 212. 
 89. See, e.g., Wis. Hosp. Ass’n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 1987) (requiring courts 
shifting fees to find that that the fee and nonfee claims are “closely related” factually); supra 
note 79. 
 90. This example is taken from Lenard v. Argento, in which the court held that “[t]he 
beating claim and the claim of a conspiracy to deny [the plaintiff] the equal protection of 
the laws are related to each other, because they both grow out of the beating.” Lenard v. 
Argento, 808 F.2d 1242, 1246 (7th Cir. 1987). Lenard, however, is not within the scope of the 
Gagne doctrine, because the plaintiff had prevailed on an equal protection fee claim, and so the 
trial court decided the case on Hensley grounds. Id. at 1244–46. 
 91. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 92. The factual similarity could be conceptual or temporal. See Lenard, 808 F.2d at 1246 
(analyzing claims for conceptual and temporal similarities to determine whether the claims were 
related). 
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and legal similarity.93 This approach, however, seems inconsistent with 
the plain meaning of “common nucleus of operative fact.” Without 
requiring similarity between the legal theories underpinning fee and 
nonfee claims, plaintiffs could seek fees even though success on the 
nonfee claims does not bear at all on success on the fee claims. Under 
this test, even the Carandola plaintiffs theoretically could still obtain 
a fee award. There, the plaintiffs’ statutory interpretation claim and 
constitutional claim both grew out of a city ordinance affecting an 
adult bookstore. Thus, the heightened common nucleus of operative 
fact requirement, although feasible, would not restrict the scope of 
the Gagne rule enough to offer some indication that the defendant 
violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. 
C. Third Alternative: Requiring Reasonably Related Legal Theories 
as a Third Prong 
Third, and most preferably, courts could restrict the scope of 
Gagne by reading Smith as creating a new and separate requirement 
for determining eligibility for fees. Under this approach, the 
substantiality and common nucleus of operative fact prongs of the 
Gagne rule would remain as merely federal question and 
supplemental jurisdiction inquiries. Then a third prong would require 
plaintiffs to show that fee and nonfee claims are reasonably related. 
This approach is appealing because it avoids weakening the 
restriction and emphasizes the need for a heightened inquiry into the 
similarity of the claims. As Part II.B has shown, when courts fail to 
view “reasonably related” as a separate inquiry, they often ultimately 
view the Gagne rule simply as a supplemental jurisdiction inquiry.94 
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “there is no 
certain method of determining when claims are ‘related’ or 
‘unrelated,’”95 it encouraged courts to look at whether the claims dealt 
with different facts and legal theories.96 Smith held that the claims 
were not reasonably related when they relied on different facts, legal 
theories, and warranted different relief.97 Thus, when determining 
whether fee and nonfee claims are reasonably related, courts could 
appropriately take one of two approaches to determine whether 
 
 93. See supra note 79.  
 94. See supra Part II.B. 
 95. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 n.12 (1983). 
 96. Id. at 435. 
 97. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1015 (1984). 
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plaintiffs are eligible for fees in light of Smith. Courts could interpret 
Smith liberally and determine that parties have prevailed for § 1988 
purposes so long as they present fee and nonfee claims involving 
reasonably related relief, facts, or legal theories.98 Otherwise, courts 
could interpret Smith as imposing a more restrictive test and view 
parties as having prevailed only if fee and nonfee claims share 
reasonably related relief, facts, and legal theories. Most critically 
under this approach, though, courts must find that fee and nonfee 
claims raise related legal theories. Although the latter option more 
likely would deny prevailing-party status to plaintiffs when the Gagne 
rule applies, it most effectively limits fee eligibility to situations in 
which some likelihood exists that the defendant violated the 
plaintiff’s civil rights without requiring courts to formally adjudicate 
the constitutional claim on the merits.  
The first approach—requiring that the plaintiff only show that 
the fee and nonfee claims were reasonably related through relief, 
facts, or legal theories—would not meaningfully restrict the Gagne 
rule or offer courts any indication that the defendant violated the 
plaintiff’s civil rights. Again returning to the Carandola case, a state 
could enact a statute regulating sexually oriented businesses. The 
plaintiff could then file a suit alleging violations of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments (a fee claim) and also argue, based solely 
on statutory interpretation, that the statute did not apply to its 
business (a nonfee claim). If the court ruled on the state law claim 
and did not address the fee claim, counsel for the plaintiff could argue 
that it is a prevailing party under the looser interpretation of 
“reasonably related” because the plaintiff sought the same relief (a 
declaratory judgment) and the plaintiff’s fee and nonfee claims 
involve similar facts (the enactment of the statute and the content of 
the statute as applied to the business).99 But a court ruling that a 
statute does not apply to a particular plaintiff in no way suggests that 
the statute itself violates the plaintiff’s civil rights. Allowing a party to 
 
 98. See Plaintiff-Appellants’ Supplemental Reply Brief in Case Number 07-1249, at 9, 
Giovanni Carandola, Ltd. v. City of Greensboro, 258 F. App’x 512 (4th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-2181 
& 07-1249), 2007 WL 2680234 (“In Smith the Supreme Court denied fees because both of the 
following were true: the claims presented by the plaintiffs advanced different legal theories and 
proceeded from different facts. The logical extension of this is that claims which share either a 
common factual basis or proceed from a common legal theory are sufficiently related to support 
a fee award.” (citation omitted)). 
 99. In fact, plaintiffs’ counsel raised precisely this argument. See id. at 6–10 (arguing that 
the two claims were sufficiently related because they asked for the same relief and were 
factually similar). 
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prevail for § 1988 purposes based solely on relief-based, factual, or 
legal similarity thus does not substantively differentiate the 
reasonably related standard from the common nucleus of operative 
fact inquiry. 
If courts instead interpret Smith restrictively and require 
plaintiffs to demonstrate relief-based, factual, and legal similarity, 
then the Gagne rule would allow plaintiffs to recover fees despite the 
avoidance doctrine and also give at least some assurance that the 
defendant violated the plaintiff’s civil rights. For example, if a 
plaintiff filed a lawsuit arising from a police beating, presenting claims 
under state battery laws and alleging a due process violation for 
excessive force, the fee and nonfee claims would be similar enough to 
meet this restrictive test. The fee and nonfee claims would, demand 
the same relief (damages), be factually related (arising out of the 
beating), and present similar legal theories (the unacceptable use of 
force). The most important connection is that the fee and nonfee 
claims—not considering the state or federal nature of the claims—
present related legal theories. This nexus helps to assure the court 
that, given the success on the nonfee claim, the plaintiff was at least 
somewhat likely to succeed on the fee claim without actually 
requiring the court to evaluate the merits of the constitutional issue. 
With the police brutality example, the success of the nonfee claim 
would give the court at least some indication that the harm alleged 
under the fee claim actually occurred because both claims alleged 
similar harm. This more stringent approach most appropriately 
addresses the fairness concerns voiced in Smith: it still respects the 
avoidance doctrine, but it lets courts be more certain that a plaintiff 
who prevailed on a nonfee claim would also prevail on the fee claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs should have access to the courts to vindicate violations 
of their civil rights. Section 1988 provides a valuable tool to ensure 
that high litigation costs do not prevent plaintiffs from realizing this 
goal. Although the statute’s legislative history and the early court 
decisions interpreting it understandably read § 1988 broadly to help 
accomplish these statutory goals, its scope must be considered against 
the backdrop of the American rule, which is “deeply rooted in our 
history and in congressional policy.”100 Because of the rule’s 
 
 100. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245–46, 271 (1975). 
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importance, courts should construe exceptions to the American rule 
narrowly. The Gagne rule, however, as most circuit courts have 
interpreted it, extends the scope of § 1988 entirely too far. 
Although courts should not punish plaintiffs by denying fees 
because of courts’ hesitancy to decide constitutional issues, 
defendants deserve consideration as well. Courts must take steps to 
protect defendants from being forced to pay the fees of their 
opponents’ counsel without any indication that the defendants have 
violated the rights § 1988 seeks to protect. To balance these two 
policy interests, the courts should restrict the Gagne rule. Before 
finding a plaintiff eligible for fees in a Gagne situation, federal courts 
should find that 
1. the fee claim is substantial enough to support federal 
question jurisdiction; 
2. the nonfee claim and the fee claim arise out of a common 
nucleus of operative fact, meaning that the nonfee claim was 
properly joined under the court’s supplemental jurisdiction; 
and 
3. the nonfee claim is reasonably related to the fee claim 
because it is based on substantially similar facts, legal theories, 
and desired relief, with a particular emphasis on how related 
the legal theories are. 
Although this more restrictive rule would likely prevent some 
plaintiffs from recovering fees even though their unaddressed fee 
claims would have been successful, it properly incorporates Smith into 
Gagne and addresses the Smith Court’s policy concerns. Yet this new 
rule allows the heart of Gagne to survive while offering increased 
protection to defendants who are otherwise vulnerable to paying 
attorneys’ fees even though they did not violate plaintiffs’ civil rights. 
Section 1988 was created to help plaintiffs hold defendants 
accountable for civil rights violations. The modifications to the Gagne 
rule this Note advocates give some assurance that defendants have 
violated plaintiffs’ civil rights without requiring courts to 
unnecessarily look into the actual merits of constitutional claims. 
These modifications should help restore § 1988 to its original purpose 
and promote uniformity among lower courts when awarding fees. 
